---
ticker: "UBER"
company: "Uber Technologies, Inc."
date: "2026-10-15"
view: "Buy"
fair_value: 90
price: 71.22
price_source: "last trade"
price_time: "2026-10-15T19:59:59Z"
price_vs_fair_value: "-20.9%"
bear: 35
bull: 140
exit_price: 151
page: "https://alpha.dming.si/research/2026-10-15-uber"
---

# UBER · Uber Technologies, Inc. · Buy

Research report as of 2026-10-15, partly unblinded. Page: https://alpha.dming.si/research/2026-10-15-uber

We value UBER at $90 a share. The report's $71.22 price (Oct 15, 2026) was 21% below fair value: Buy.

_Not restated: model.py forecasts no fixed or intangible reinvestment (its autonomous-vehicle spend is a stake in the bridge), so the shared method's fade has no return on new capital to start from._

| Lens | Range | Marks |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Our report | $35 to $140 | fair $90 |
| Street targets (13) | $74 to $150 | average $105, median $100 |
| Price | | $71.22 |

Bands run from our bear to bull and the Street's low to high. Street targets forecast future prices, not value today. Market data, captured Oct 16, 2026.

| Figure | Value |
| --- | --- |
| Fair value | $90 |
| Price | $71.22 (market data, Oct 15, 12:59 PM PT) |
| Five-year return | 15.5% (a year, at the price) |
| Bear / bull | $35 / $140 |
| Exit price | $151 (on Dec 31, 2031) |
| Confidence | 35% |

_As of 2026-10-15 · partly unblinded. The model was committed and pushed in at 13:14:45 PDT, before we read any UBER quote, multiple, analyst estimate, target, headline or Alpha rank (Alpha is Capfolio's own stock-ranking model). It was not fully blind: the analyst remembered the 2024-25 price, about $60-100, from training data, and 10-Q items place the H1 2026 price near $74-75 (see assumptions.md). Price first read 13:15 PDT. We revised the value twice after the blind commit (section 8). First our own checks of the draft held back operating cash ($96 to $95). Then two outside reviews, one auditing the model and one arguing the opposite side, took it to $90: tax at 26%, the long fade discounted at the cost of equity, legal charges at 0.36% of bookings, slower corporate-cost gains, and fixes to deferred tax and the outside view._

- **Fair value today:** $90 per diluted share (cost of equity 10.40%); $89 weighting bear/central/bull 25/50/25 (our weights)
- **Price:** $71.22, last trade, 2026-10-15 19:59:59 UTC → upside 26%
- **Five-year exit price:** $151 at 2031-12-31 (median of judged exit multiple 18x $158, long fade $136, outside view 16.9x peer forward P/E $151)
- **Five-year return:** 15.5% a year from $71.22 (no dividend; free cash is kept as net cash)
- **Purchase price:** $83 to earn the 12% hurdle (a placeholder hurdle; the owner has not set one)
- **Bear / bull today:** $35 / $140: a severe but plausible bad case and the matching good case, each one consistent business outcome
- **Confidence:** 35% (subjective, not calibrated): chance the 2031 value lands within ±20% of $151
- **Moat:** The largest two-sided network in rides and delivery outside China ($236B of 2025 Gross Bookings with Delivery Hero, management deck); cheap cross-selling between the two; asset-light (capex $0.34B against $0.75B depreciation, 2025)
- **Market expects:** On our earnings, 12.4x 2032 NOPAT at exit (ours 18x); or Gross Bookings growth 4.9 points a year below ours (12% in 2027 falling to 3%); or a Mobility margin of 6.2% of Gross Bookings from 2028 (7.66% in H1 2026)
- **Key driver:** Gross Bookings growth 2027-32: ±2 points a year is −$8 / +$9. Next, the Mobility margin: 7.0% is $79, 9.0% is $99 (central 8.1%); held at 7.4% (no gain on Q3 2025) it is $83
- **Alpha model:** Capfolio's own stock-ranking model: rank 328 of 709 (tier Neutral, score 53.9, as of 2026-10-14; rerate required, cache partial, so its saved scores were not fully refreshed): valuation B (#74), quality C, growth C, momentum D, expectations D. Integrity CLEAN
- **Street:** market data: 45 buy, 8 hold, 1 sell; mean target $101.45 (range $70-150), last updated 2026-09-10. Market data: 54 analysts, Q3 2026 EPS consensus $0.864 (guide $0.84-0.88). An expectations reference, not validation

**We rate Uber a Buy.** Our central estimate of its value is $90 a share
against a $71.22 price, and it returns 15.5% a year over five years on our
numbers. The price assumes that autonomous fleets (robotaxis) cut Uber's US
ride-hailing profit well before 2031. Our central case already charges that
threat and still gets $90 (sections 4 and 5).

**Terms used below.** Every figure is in US dollars. "Gross Bookings" is what
customers pay through the platform; "segment operating income" is Uber's own
segment profit, after stock pay and depreciation. NOPAT is operating profit
after tax. The cost of equity is the yearly return shareholders require, used
to bring future cash back to today. Each report values a company three ways:
the central case is our best estimate, the bear case a severe but plausible
bad outcome, and the bull case the matching good outcome. The exit price is
our estimate of the share price on 2031-12-31, taken as the median of three
methods. The judged exit multiple is what we think the market will pay for
each dollar of 2032 NOPAT. The long fade values the company by letting its
growth and its return on new capital fall gradually toward normal levels over
15 years. The outside view applies what comparable companies trade at today.
The model is model.py (output in output.txt); what
the price assumes is unblinded.py (output in
unblinded-output.txt); the blind record is
assumptions.md.

## 1. How Uber makes money, and what limits it

Riders and eaters pay Uber; Uber keeps about 30% of a Mobility booking and
19% of a Delivery booking as revenue (2025, reported) and pays drivers,
couriers, insurance and incentives out of it. What is left after all of
that, stock pay included, was 7.4% of Mobility bookings and 3.5% of
Delivery bookings in 2025, and 7.66% and 3.77% in H1 2026 (reported,
segment operating income). Corporate costs take about 2% of bookings.
Freight still loses money.

Three things limit it. Drivers must earn enough to show up, so Uber's take
cannot rise much. Insurance is the largest cost Uber controls only in part:
it self-insures through a captive, so a bad claims year lands on Uber
(reserves $13.3B on 2026-06-30). And regulators and courts set the labor
and liability rules city by city (accrued legal, regulatory and non-income
tax claims $1.84B).

Uber is asset-light: capex was $0.34B in 2025 against $0.75B depreciation
(market data cash-flow statement), and working capital gave cash ($2.2B in 2025),
mostly because insurance reserves grow with bookings (10-Q Q2 2026
liquidity discussion). Reported free cash flow ($9.8B in 2025) is well
above the earnings we value, because it adds back $1.8B of stock pay,
which we treat as a cost.

## 2. Uber has beaten its own guidance in each of the last eight quarters

Management has beaten its own guide every quarter for two years
(reported, against each release's outlook):

| | Gross Bookings, median vs guide midpoint | Adjusted EBITDA, median vs midpoint | Below the low end |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Q3 2024 to Q2 2026 (8 quarters) | +1.56% | +1.94% | never |

The last three quarters landed above the top of the Gross Bookings range.
Our Q3 2026 forecast is the midpoint of the guide times that median beat:
Gross Bookings $60.2B (guide $58.25-60.25B), Adjusted EBITDA $2.97B (guide
$2.86-2.96B). Uber reports Q3 on 2026-11-04 (earnings calendar; Uber
announced the call date on 2026-10-05). Q2 2026 grew Gross Bookings 24% to
$58.0B (22% in constant currency, management); trailing free cash flow passed $10B (management claim, Q2 call).

## 3. Our forecast values Uber at $90 a share

Each segment has its own path (model result, central, $B):

| | 2026E | 2027 | 2029 | 2031 | 2032 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Mobility bookings | 118.3 | 138.4 | 176.7 | 211.9 | 228.8 |
| Delivery bookings | 113.0 | 132.2 | 168.8 | 202.4 | 218.6 |
| Freight bookings | 6.1 | 6.4 | 7.1 | 7.8 | 8.2 |
| Mobility margin | 7.7% (H2) | 7.9% | 8.1% | 8.1% | 8.1% |
| Delivery margin | 3.85% (H2) | 4.0% | 4.4% | 4.6% | 4.6% |
| EBIT after legal | 8.31 | 10.04 | 14.04 | 18.07 | 19.51 |
| NOPAT (26% tax) | | 7.43 | 10.39 | 13.37 | 14.44 |

How the model counts each claim on the company, once:

- **Stock pay** is a cost inside segment operating income. The share count
  is held at 2,052.7M (2,042.56M on 2026-07-31 plus options and a 4M
  allowance for the 2028 convertible). Unvested RSUs are not added, because
  the expense already pays for them.
- **Insurance.** Claims cost sits in segment margins. The balance sheet adds
  one claim: reserves less the restricted cash and investments held against
  them and reinsurance recoverables, after tax, $0.79B. Prior-year
  development was +$158M, −$78M and −$21M in 2023-25 (10-K Schedule II), so
  the central case adds nothing; the bear adds 10% adverse development.
  The float's growth and the interest on restricted assets are not counted
  as value: a conservative choice worth roughly $2-3 a share (our
  estimate, not modelled).
- **Legal and regulatory** charges run at 0.36% of bookings a year, the
  reported average of 2024 to H1 2026 (0.69% in 2024, 0.29% in 2025, 0.01%
  in H1 2026), plus the accrual ($1.84B on 2026-06-30, taken as $1.8B) as a claim at exit.
- **Equity stakes** (Didi $1.90B, Grab $2.02B, Aurora $1.76B, others $3.35B
  on 2026-06-30, 10-Q Note 3) at their June value less a 15% tax haircut,
  carried to exit at the cost of equity so they add today's value only.
- **Delivery Hero** is valued as a separate 75% stake: $5.8B paid in 2027,
  14x its 2032 NOPAT less $4.2B of bridge items, with 60% of the $1.2B
  synergies (management claim) counted. If the deal fails, value is $89.
- **Tax** is 26% on operating profit: the recurring lines of the 2025 10-K
  rate reconciliation (21% federal, 2.7% state, GILTI and FDII, which are
  US taxes and deductions on foreign income, Brazil withholding, foreign tax
  credits, R&D credits, stock pay) sum to about 25.8%. Valuation-allowance releases, one-off losses and price-driven
  excess stock benefits are left out. H1 2026's 27.7% book rate includes
  deferred US tax on equity-stake gains, which this line does not cover.
- **Deferred tax assets** (tax benefits already earned that lower future tax
  bills; $10.16B on 2026-06-30, less $1.77B of
  accrual-type items that never turn into cash in a growing business:
  accruals and reserves, legal, stock pay and lease, net of the
  right-of-use liability, 10-K 2025 tax note) shield up to half of each
  year's tax.
- **Operating cash.** Amounts owed to drivers and merchants ($1.77B on
  2026-06-30, grown with bookings to $3.2B by 2031) are held back from net
  cash at exit (added after the blind commit, section 8).

**Autonomous vehicles (AVs): which case charges what.** The threat is in the
central case: Mobility growth fades from 17% to 8%, and the Mobility margin
stops at 8.1% from 2028 instead of rising, because Waymo, Tesla and Zoox
take part of the dense US metros. The bear charges more: Mobility growth to
4% and margin to 6.3%, with a 12x multiple. The option is in the bull only:
Uber becomes the booking layer for many AV fleets, Mobility margin rises
to 9.2% and growth stays above 10%. AV cash ($8.0B over 2027-31, our share
of the $10B commitment) leaves every case and returns as stakes worth 20%,
50% or 100% of cost.

**Value, three ways (central, at 2031-12-31):** the judged exit multiple,
18x 2032 NOPAT, gives $158. The long fade (growth 7.7% falling to 3.5% over
15 years, return on new capital 40% falling to 20%, discounted at the 10.40%
cost of equity because Uber holds net cash from 2028) gives $136. The outside
view, the peer median forward P/E (price divided by next year's expected
earnings) of 16.9x applied to 2032 NOPAT plus net cash at face, gives $151.
The median of the three, $151, is the exit price. At a 10.40% cost of equity
(5.087% 10-year Treasury yield, beta 1.265, and a 4.20% equity risk premium,
the extra return investors require for holding stocks, from Damodaran, each
dated in data/market-inputs.json) it is worth $90
today.

The 18x is judged from mature marketplaces' forward P/E (BKNG 13.4x, EXPE
11.8x, EBAY 18.3x, LYFT 16.9x, ABNB 27.9x; market data, fiscal 2027, fetched
2026-10-15), a turn above their median because Uber still grows about 8%
at exit. The value-driver formula gives 19.3x at 6% growth and a 40%
return on new capital; it is a cross-check only. The multiple implies 5.6%
growth while the model's path grows 7.7% in 2033; the fade method uses the
path and lands at 14.8x. The median of the three is now the outside view.
Uber's own history gives no guide: GAAP operating profit only since 2023.

The fade's 40% starting return on new capital is below what the model's own
forecast implies: the forecast has no net investment besides AV and Delivery
Hero (capex runs below depreciation and working capital is a source of cash,
2023-25), so NOPAT nearly doubles on about $8B of AV spend that is valued
separately.

| | Bear | Central | Bull |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Mobility growth 2027 → 2032 | 13% → 4% | 17% → 8% | 20% → 11% |
| Mobility margin by 2032 | 6.3% | 8.1% | 9.2% |
| Delivery margin by 2032 | 3.8% | 4.6% | 5.2% |
| Exit multiple / fade / outside | $59 / $57 / $77 | $158 / $136 / $151 | $276 / $235 / $224 |
| Exit price (median) | $59 | $151 | $235 |
| Fair value today | $35 | $90 | $140 |
| Purchase price at 12% | $33 | $83 | $130 |
| Five-year return from $71.22 | −3.5% | 15.5% | 25.7% |

Case-weighted fair value $89 (25/50/25, our weights); weighted five-year
return 15.2% a year.

## 4. The $71.22 price assumes robotaxis hurt Uber early

Holding everything else at our central case, today's $71.22 needs one of:
an exit at 12.4x 2032 NOPAT against our 18x; Gross Bookings growth 4.9
points a year lower (12% in 2027 to 3% in 2032); or a Mobility margin of
6.2% from 2028 against 7.66% today. Moving Mobility alone 68% of the way to
our bear AV path also gets there. In plain terms the
price assumes that autonomous fleets cut Uber's Mobility profit in the US
well before 2031.

The price has fallen from a weekly close of $98.51 (week of 2025-09-15) to
$71.27 (week of 2026-10-12, still forming), 28%, while Gross Bookings grew
21-25% a year in each of the last four reported quarters (market data
weekly closes; releases). It closed at $72.46
the week before the Delivery Hero offer and $65.94 the week after (weeks of
2026-07-13 and 2026-07-20); we did not test what else moved it that week.
Capfolio's Alpha model agrees the stock is cheap (valuation B, rank 74 of
709) but ranks it Neutral overall on weak momentum and expectations; Alpha
leans on price momentum, and a gap from it is expected.

## 5. We expect Uber to keep growing; the market prices a robotaxi squeeze

The market prices Uber as a business whose best market is about to be taken
by robotaxis. We price it as a network that keeps growing double digits
for three more years, then slows to 8%, with its Mobility margin capped at
about today's level by AV competition. Our central case already charges the
threat; it does not need the AV option to work. The two views are settled
by the US Mobility numbers: trips and margin in the cities where Waymo and
Tesla run at scale. Uber said US trips and bookings accelerated in Q2, with
strong growth in Los Angeles and San Francisco (management claim, Q2 call).
If that holds through 2027, the market's view is wrong.

## 6. The bear case ($35) is a real possibility

The bear ($35) is a real possibility, not a tail. Robotaxis may cost less
than half of a human-driven ride (an analyst claim in a 2026-09-29
headline, not checked); if Waymo and Tesla run their own apps in the top US
metros, Uber loses the most profitable rides first, and its 8% Mobility
margin depends on those rides. Uber is also spending heavily: $14.6B for
Delivery Hero (a lower-margin delivery business, close in H2 2027), $2.3B
for ezCater, $10B for AVs, with debt rising to fund them. Insurance and
personal-injury litigation can surprise (a $40M wrongful-death verdict on
2026-09-18, headline). The Uber executive leading the robotaxi expansion is
leaving next month, November 2026 (Dow Jones and Reuters headlines, 2026-10-13). Our 18x
exit multiple assumes the market will again pay a growth multiple; it pays
12x on our numbers today.

## 7. What would confirm or break the call

Catalysts:
- 2026-11-04: Q3 2026 results. Our forecast: Gross Bookings $60.2B,
  Adjusted EBITDA $2.97B; the Q4 guide against our seasonality.
- First half 2027: Delivery Hero offer document and acceptance level (our
  central assumes 75%).
- Second half 2027: Delivery Hero close and regulatory decisions.

Falsifiers:
- Q3 2026 (2026-11-04): Mobility segment operating margin at or below
  7.4% of bookings (no gain on Q3 2025's 7.42%) cuts central to about $83;
  at or above 7.9% with a Q4 bookings guide of 17% or more in constant
  currency keeps $90.
- Mobility margin below 7.0% in any later quarter: toward the bear (7.0%
  from 2028 is $79).
- US Mobility trips falling year on year in any quarter: the AV threat is
  arriving faster than the central case.
- Gross Bookings below the low end of the guide in any quarter (never in
  eight quarters): the guidance record no longer holds.
- Adverse prior-year reserve development above $0.3B in a year: the
  insurance claim is larger than charged.
- Delivery Hero acceptance below 50% (deal fails): $89, little change.

## 8. Two rounds of review moved the value from $96 to $90

### Round 1: our own checks of the draft

The analyst ran the report checklist (math reruns, figures sourced, the
bridge from enterprise value to equity, coherent cases) on the draft.
Multiples, dollar values and which method set the exit price in this table
are as of the draft (central $95; the draft's model output, commit
`21586fded`, printed a central fade of 16.4x, a bear fade of $64 and a bear
multiple of $62, with the fade as the median). After round 2 below, the bear's
multiple ($59) and fade ($57) sit within $2, the central fade gives 14.8x,
and the median exit price is the multiple in the bear and the outside view in
the central case.

| Topic | Finding | What we did |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Operating cash | Net cash at exit was all treated as surplus, though Uber holds cash against $1.77B owed to drivers and merchants | Fixed in model.py: the payable, grown with bookings, is held back. −$1 (blind $96, then $95) |
| Leases | Operating lease liabilities $2.0B (2026-06-30) are not a claim | Disclosed: rent is inside segment costs, so a claim would count it twice |
| Blind file | assumptions.md quotes approximate buyback, grant and conversion prices | Disclosed: they appear only as the list of what was seen before the model; no input uses them. The pushed commit cannot be changed |
| Exit multiple against the growth path | 18x implies 4.9% growth; the path grows 7.7% in 2033 | Disclosed in section 3: the fade uses the path and gives 16.4x; the median is the fade |
| Bear case against its own path | The bear's 12x implies 2.1% growth while its path grows 4.3%, so it charges a little more than its own path | Disclosed: the median is the fade ($64), which uses the path; the multiple ($62) is not the exit price |
| AV spend | AV cash ($8.0B) is the same in every case, so investment does not bend with bookings | Disclosed: it is a fixed multi-year commitment ($10B, Q2 call), not a function of bookings; in the bear Uber would likely spend it to defend Mobility |
| Bear charges AV three times | The bear charges AV in growth, margin and the multiple | Disclosed: growth and margin are one operating world; the multiple is not the exit price (the fade is), so the third charge does not reach the value |
| Missed fact | ezCater ($2.3B cash, announced 2026-10-06) is not in the blind model | Disclosed in unblinded.py: bought at its worth, no change; worth nothing, $89 |

### Round 2: two outside reviews (2026-10-15)

An auditor checked the model's inputs and an advocate argued the opposite
side. Each effect is measured alone against the $95.34 central before this
revision (rerun of model.py on a scratch copy). The accepted changes
together give $89.99, not the sum of their parts: with the fade
discounted at the cost of equity, the median moves from the fade to the
outside view, which the discount rate does not touch.

| # | Finding | Verdict | Reason and dated source | Effect on central |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| A1 | Tax 23% unsourced, below the H1 2026 book rate (27%) | Accept, 26% | The recurring lines of the 2025 10-K rate reconciliation sum to about 25.8% (21% federal, 2.7% state, GILTI 1.8%, FDII −1.3%, Brazil withholding 2.2%, foreign tax credits −3.0%, R&D credits −0.9%, stock pay 1.6%, other 1.4%). H1 2026's 27.7% (market data quarterly statements) includes deferred US tax on equity-stake gains (10-Q Q2 2026 income tax note) | −$3.53 |
| A2 | Long fade discounted at a 9.75% WACC while Uber holds net cash | Accept | The model has Uber in net cash from 2028 and $43B at exit, so no debt tax shield remains to lower the rate; the fade now uses the 10.40% cost of equity. The headline no longer rests on that spread: the median is now the outside view | −$4.83 alone |
| A3 | Deferred tax asset includes accrual-type items that never turn into cash | Accept | 10-K 2025 tax note: accruals and reserves $1.297B, accrued legal $0.234B, stock pay $0.122B, lease $0.367B, less right-of-use liability $0.253B = $1.77B, removed from the shield pool | −$0.46 |
| A4 | Convertible adds about 9.5M shares at a $160 exit, not 4M | Partly | The notes mature in December 2028 (10-Q Q2 2026 debt table), so they settle at that date's price, not at exit. At our central value carried to December 2028 ($111) net share settlement above the $95.81 cap is 3.3M against our 4M allowance (unblinded.py). Allowance kept | +$0.03 (not applied) |
| A5 | Outside view capitalises interest on cash at 16.9x instead of adding cash at face | Accept | The P/E now applies to 2032 NOPAT and net cash is added at face | +$2.14 |
| A6 | The AV charge is light; the market charges 5 points of growth a year | Partly | Measured: against the bull's Mobility path the central case charges $10 a share in margin and $22 in margin and growth (unblinded.py). Waymo held about 15% of San Francisco and Los Angeles rideshare bookings in June 2026, below 16-19% in January (YipitData via Business Insider, as reported by secondary sources; original not read), and Uber's Mobility margin rose from 7.28% (Q2 2025) to 7.64% (Q2 2026, releases). No further charge without new evidence; the Q3 2026 falsifier is tightened instead (A11) | $0 |
| A7 | Mobility margin flat at 7.6% (advocate) | Reject | Reported Mobility segment margin: 7.01% (2024), 7.39% (2025), 7.66% (H1 2026); Q2 2026 7.64% against 7.28% a year earlier. Our path adds 0.2 points a year for two years, below that pace. The advocate's Waymo source shows share falling since January | −$5.21 if applied; $0 |
| A8 | Corporate costs flat at 1.85% of bookings (advocate) | Partly | Reported ratio: 2.14% (2024), 1.96% (2025), 1.95% (H1 2026); Q2 2026 1.90% against 2.00%. But corporate costs grew 9% in 2025 and 18% in H1 2026 (H1 $2.18B against $1.84B, releases), so the recent gain came from 24% bookings growth that our case slows. The path now falls to 1.65% by 2031, not 1.55%. The 3,300 job cuts of 2026-09-02 are the advocate's source and were not read | −$1.99 (advocate −$5.79) |
| A9 | Delivery margin flat at 4.0% (advocate) | Reject | Reported Delivery segment margin: 2.85% (2024), 3.47% (2025), 3.77% (H1 2026); Q2 2026 3.84% against 3.52%. Our path adds 0.2 points a year to 4.6%, slower than reported. DoorDash at 2.8% of order value before stock pay (advocate's figure, not checked) is already below Uber after stock pay, so it does not cap Uber | −$5.56 if applied; $0 |
| A10 | Legal and regulatory charges at 0.45% of bookings (advocate) | Partly, 0.36% | The reported average from 2024 to H1 2026 is 0.36% ($1.70B on $468B of bookings, releases). The EU Platform Work Directive (transposition due 2026-12-02) would change driver costs inside segment margins, not legal charges | −$1.26 (advocate −$3.15) |
| A11 | Q3 2026 Mobility margin is the flip fact; the falsifier was too loose | Accept | Section 7 now names Q3 2026: at or below 7.4% (no gain on Q3 2025's 7.42%) central falls to about $83 (unblinded.py); at or above 7.9% with a Q4 guide of 17% or more it holds | $0 |
| | All accepted together | | | $95 → $90 |

## 9. Sources

- SEC EDGAR (CIK 1543151), read 2026-10-15: 10-K 2025 (filed 2026-02-13);
  10-Qs Q3 2025, Q1 2026, Q2 2026 (filed 2026-08-05); releases Q2 2024 to
  Q2 2026 (8-K ex. 99.1); 8-Ks 2026-01-12, 2026-07-16 (Delivery Hero),
  2026-08-07, 2026-09-15. Excerpts in
  data/filing-excerpts.txt.
- Q2 2026 call, Quartr via market data (notes).
- Market data statements, segmentation and peer estimates, fetched 2026-10-15
  (data/).
- Market data: US 10-year, EUR/USD and betas (2026-10-15 20:02 UTC); weekly
  closes, headlines, forecasts and earnings calendar (read after the blind
  commit).
- Damodaran implied ERP, 2026-10-01.
- Market data: quote (2026-10-15 19:59:59 UTC) and analyst ratings (updated
  2026-09-10).
- Alpha: `alpha rank UBER --raw --json --allow-stale-model-cache`, as of
  2026-10-14.